[linux-2.6-block.git] / include / linux / capability.h

/*
 * This is <linux/capability.h>
 *
 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
 *
 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
 *
 * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
 */

#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H

#include <linux/types.h>

struct task_struct;

/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
   capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
   kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
   it. */

/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
   a set of three capability sets.  The transposition of 3*the
   following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
   library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
   etc.. */

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1  0x19980330
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1     1

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2  0x20071026  /* deprecated - use v3 */
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2     2

#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3  0x20080522
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3     2

typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
	__u32 version;
	int pid;
} __user *cap_user_header_t;

typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
        __u32 effective;
        __u32 permitted;
        __u32 inheritable;
} __user *cap_user_data_t;


#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX

#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT	24
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE	0x000001

#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1	0x01000000
#define VFS_CAP_U32_1           1
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_1))

#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2	0x02000000
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2           2
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))

#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ           XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
#define VFS_CAP_U32             VFS_CAP_U32_2
#define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_2

struct vfs_cap_data {
	__le32 magic_etc;            /* Little endian */
	struct {
		__le32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
		__le32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
};

#ifndef __KERNEL__

/*
 * Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
 * 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
 * libcap to untrap yourself...
 */
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S     _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1

#else

#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
extern int file_caps_enabled;
#endif

typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
} kernel_cap_t;

/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
	__u32 magic_etc;
	kernel_cap_t permitted;
	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
};

#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))

#endif


/**
 ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
 **/

/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
   overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
   ownership. */

#define CAP_CHOWN            0

/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
   [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
   CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */

#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1

/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
   and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
   defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */

#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2

/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
   file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
   is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */

#define CAP_FOWNER           3

/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
   shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
   bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
   supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
   the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
   cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */

#define CAP_FSETID           4

/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
   process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
   of the process receiving the signal. */

#define CAP_KILL             5

/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
/* Allows setgroups(2) */
/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */

#define CAP_SETGID           6

/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */

#define CAP_SETUID           7


/**
 ** Linux-specific capabilities
 **/

/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
 *   Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
 *   remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
 * With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
 *   Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
 *       to the current process' inheritable set
 *   Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
 *   Allow modification of the securebits for a process
 */

#define CAP_SETPCAP          8

/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */

#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE  9

/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */

#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10

/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */

#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST    11

/* Allow interface configuration */
/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
/* Allow modification of routing tables */
/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
   sockets */
/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
/* Allow multicasting */
/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */

#define CAP_NET_ADMIN        12

/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */

#define CAP_NET_RAW          13

/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
   with IPC) */

#define CAP_IPC_LOCK         14

/* Override IPC ownership checks */

#define CAP_IPC_OWNER        15

/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
#define CAP_SYS_MODULE       16

/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */

#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO        17

/* Allow use of chroot() */

#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT       18

/* Allow ptrace() of any process */

#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE       19

/* Allow configuration of process accounting */

#define CAP_SYS_PACCT        20

/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
/* Allow administration of the random device */
/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
/* Allow setting the domainname */
/* Allow setting the hostname */
/* Allow calling bdflush() */
/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
/* Allow nfsservctl */
/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
/* Allow removing semaphores */
/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
   and shared memory */
/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
/* Allow turning swap on/off */
/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
   extra ioctls) */
/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
/* Allow access to the nvram device */
/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
/* Allow setting up serial ports */
/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
   arbitrary SCSI commands */
/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */

#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN        21

/* Allow use of reboot() */

#define CAP_SYS_BOOT         22

/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
   UID) processes */
/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
   processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
   process. */
/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */

#define CAP_SYS_NICE         23

/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
/* Override quota limits. */
/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
   resources) */
/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
   you can override using fsuid too */
/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
/* Override max number of keymaps */

#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE     24

/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
/* Allow setting the real-time clock */

#define CAP_SYS_TIME         25

/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
/* Allow vhangup() of tty */

#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG   26

/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */

#define CAP_MKNOD            27

/* Allow taking of leases on files */

#define CAP_LEASE            28

#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29

#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30

#define CAP_SETFCAP	     31

/* Override MAC access.
   The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
   to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
   the capability it should use to do so. */

#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE     32

/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
   The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
   An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
   to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
   policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
   capability it should use to do so. */

#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN        33

#define CAP_LAST_CAP         CAP_MAC_ADMIN

#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)

/*
 * Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
 */

#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x)     ((x) >> 5)        /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
#define CAP_TO_MASK(x)      (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */

#ifdef __KERNEL__

/*
 * Internal kernel functions only
 */

#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)

/*
 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
 *
 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
 *
 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
 *
 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
 *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
 *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
 */

# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)	\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)	\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)		\
			    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))

# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))

#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */

# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })

#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */

#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET    CAP_EMPTY_SET

# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
# define cap_set_full(c)      do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
# define cap_set_init_eff(c)  do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)

#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))

#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
do {                                                                \
	unsigned __capi;                                            \
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
		c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
	}                                                           \
} while (0)

#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
do {                                                                \
	unsigned __capi;                                            \
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
		c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
	}                                                           \
} while (0)

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
				       const kernel_cap_t b)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
					 const kernel_cap_t b)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
				    const kernel_cap_t drop)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
	return dest;
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
	return dest;
}

static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	unsigned __capi;
	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
			return 0;
	}
	return 1;
}

/*
 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
 * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
 *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
 * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
 *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
 */
static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
{
	kernel_cap_t dest;
	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
	return cap_isclear(dest);
}

/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */

static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
					    const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	return cap_combine(a,
			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
}

static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
					      const kernel_cap_t permitted)
{
	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	return cap_combine(a,
			   cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
}

extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;

/**
 * has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
 * @t: The task in question
 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 *
 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 * currently in effect, false if not.
 *
 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 */
#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)

/**
 * has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
 * @t: The task in question
 * @cap: The capability to be tested for
 *
 * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
 * currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
 * check.
 *
 * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
 */
#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
	(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)

extern int capable(int cap);

/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
struct dentry;
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);

#endif /* __KERNEL__ */

#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
Commit	Line	Data
1da177e4 LT	1	/*
	2	* This is <linux/capability.h>
	3	*
b5376771	4	* Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
1da177e4 LT	5	* Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
	6	* with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
	7	*
	8	* See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
	9	*
b5376771 SH	10	* ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
b5376771 SH	11	*/
1da177e4 LT	12
	13	#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
	14	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
	15
	16	#include <linux/types.h>
1da177e4	17
b7add02d AM	18	struct task_struct;
b7add02d AM	19
1da177e4 LT	20	/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
	21	capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
	22	kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
	23	it. */
	24
e338d263	25	/* Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX (draft) to be an "opaque" pointer to
1da177e4 LT	26	a set of three capability sets. The transposition of 3*the
	27	following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
	28	library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
	29	etc.. */
b5376771	30
e338d263 AM	31	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1 0x19980330
	32	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1 1
	33
ca05a99a	34	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2 0x20071026 /* deprecated - use v3 */
e338d263 AM	35	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2 2
e338d263 AM	36
ca05a99a AM	37	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 0x20080522
ca05a99a AM	38	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 2
1da177e4 LT	39
	40	typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
	41	__u32 version;
	42	int pid;
	43	} __user *cap_user_header_t;
b5376771	44
1da177e4 LT	45	typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
	46	__u32 effective;
	47	__u32 permitted;
	48	__u32 inheritable;
	49	} __user *cap_user_data_t;
1da177e4	50
e338d263	51
b5376771 SH	52	#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
	53	#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
	54
b5376771	55	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000
851f7ff5	56	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24
e338d263 AM	57	#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
	58	#define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE 0x000001
	59
b5376771	60	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_1 0x01000000
e338d263 AM	61	#define VFS_CAP_U32_1 1
e338d263 AM	62	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1 (sizeof(__le32)(1 + 2VFS_CAP_U32_1))
b5376771	63
e338d263 AM	64	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 0x02000000
	65	#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
	66	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)(1 + 2VFS_CAP_U32_2))
	67
	68	#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
	69	#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
	70	#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
b5376771	71
b5376771	72	struct vfs_cap_data {
e338d263	73	__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
8f6936f4	74	struct {
e338d263 AM	75	__le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
	76	__le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
	77	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
b5376771 SH	78	};
b5376771 SH	79
ca05a99a AM	80	#ifndef __KERNEL__
	81
	82	/*
	83	* Backwardly compatible definition for source code - trapped in a
	84	* 32-bit world. If you find you need this, please consider using
	85	* libcap to untrap yourself...
	86	*/
	87	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1
	88	#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1
	89
	90	#else
	91
	92	#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
	93	#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
1da177e4	94
9fa91d99 JSR	95	#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
	96	extern int file_caps_enabled;
	97	#endif
	98
1da177e4	99	typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
ca05a99a	100	__u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
1da177e4 LT	101	} kernel_cap_t;
1da177e4 LT	102
c0b00441 EP	103	/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
	104	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
	105	__u32 magic_etc;
	106	kernel_cap_t permitted;
	107	kernel_cap_t inheritable;
	108	};
	109
e338d263	110	#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
1da177e4 LT	111	#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
	112
	113	#endif
	114
	115
	116	/**
b5376771	117	** POSIX-draft defined capabilities.
1da177e4 LT	118	**/
	119
	120	/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
	121	overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
	122	ownership. */
	123
	124	#define CAP_CHOWN 0
	125
	126	/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
	127	[_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
	128	CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	129
	130	#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
	131
	132	/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
	133	and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
	134	defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
	135
	136	#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH 2
b5376771	137
1da177e4 LT	138	/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
	139	file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
	140	is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
	141
	142	#define CAP_FOWNER 3
	143
	144	/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
	145	shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
	146	bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
	147	supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
	148	the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
	149	cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
	150
	151	#define CAP_FSETID 4
	152
1da177e4 LT	153	/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
	154	process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
	155	of the process receiving the signal. */
	156
	157	#define CAP_KILL 5
	158
	159	/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
	160	/* Allows setgroups(2) */
	161	/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
	162
	163	#define CAP_SETGID 6
	164
	165	/* Allows setuid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). /
	166	/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
	167
	168	#define CAP_SETUID 7
	169
	170
	171	/**
	172	** Linux-specific capabilities
	173	**/
	174
e338d263 AM	175	/* Without VFS support for capabilities:
	176	* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
	177	* remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid
	178	* With VFS support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
3b7391de SH	179	* Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
	180	* to the current process' inheritable set
	181	* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
3898b1b4	182	* Allow modification of the securebits for a process
e338d263	183	*/
1da177e4 LT	184
	185	#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
	186
	187	/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
	188
	189	#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE 9
	190
	191	/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
	192	/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
	193
	194	#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
	195
	196	/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
	197
	198	#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST 11
	199
	200	/* Allow interface configuration */
	201	/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
	202	/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
	203	/* Allow modification of routing tables */
	204	/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
	205	sockets */
	206	/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
	207	/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
	208	/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
	209	/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
	210	/* Allow multicasting */
	211	/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
	212	/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
	213
	214	#define CAP_NET_ADMIN 12
	215
	216	/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
	217	/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
	218
	219	#define CAP_NET_RAW 13
	220
	221	/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
	222	/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
	223	with IPC) */
	224
	225	#define CAP_IPC_LOCK 14
	226
	227	/* Override IPC ownership checks */
	228
	229	#define CAP_IPC_OWNER 15
	230
	231	/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
1da177e4 LT	232	#define CAP_SYS_MODULE 16
	233
	234	/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
	235	/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
	236
	237	#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO 17
	238
	239	/* Allow use of chroot() */
	240
	241	#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT 18
	242
	243	/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
	244
	245	#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE 19
	246
	247	/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
	248
	249	#define CAP_SYS_PACCT 20
	250
	251	/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
	252	/* Allow administration of the random device */
	253	/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
	254	/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
	255	/* Allow setting the domainname */
	256	/* Allow setting the hostname */
	257	/* Allow calling bdflush() */
	258	/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
	259	/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
	260	/* Allow nfsservctl */
	261	/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
	262	/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
	263	/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
	264	/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
	265	/* Allow removing semaphores */
	266	/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
	267	and shared memory */
	268	/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
	269	/* Allow turning swap on/off */
	270	/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
	271	/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
	272	/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
	273	/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
	274	/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
	275	extra ioctls) */
	276	/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
	277	/* Allow access to the nvram device */
	278	/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
	279	/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
	280	/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
	281	/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
	282	/* Allow setting up serial ports */
	283	/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
	284	/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
	285	arbitrary SCSI commands */
	286	/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
bce5f6ba	287	/* Allow setting zone reclaim policy */
1da177e4 LT	288
	289	#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN 21
	290
	291	/* Allow use of reboot() */
	292
	293	#define CAP_SYS_BOOT 22
	294
	295	/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
	296	UID) processes */
	297	/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
	298	processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
	299	process. */
	300	/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
	301
	302	#define CAP_SYS_NICE 23
	303
	304	/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
	305	/* Override quota limits. */
	306	/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
	307	/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
	308	resources) */
b5376771	309	/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so
1da177e4 LT	310	you can override using fsuid too */
	311	/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
	312	/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
	313	/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
	314	/* Override max number of keymaps */
	315
	316	#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE 24
	317
	318	/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
	319	/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
	320	/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
	321
	322	#define CAP_SYS_TIME 25
	323
	324	/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
	325	/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
	326
	327	#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG 26
	328
	329	/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
	330
	331	#define CAP_MKNOD 27
	332
	333	/* Allow taking of leases on files */
	334
	335	#define CAP_LEASE 28
	336
	337	#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE 29
	338
	339	#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
	340
b5376771 SH	341	#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
b5376771 SH	342
e114e473 CS	343	/* Override MAC access.
	344	The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
	345	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	346	to implement capability based overrides of that policy, this is
	347	the capability it should use to do so. */
	348
	349	#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE 32
	350
	351	/* Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
	352	The base kernel requires no MAC configuration.
	353	An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses
	354	to implement capability based checks on modifications to that
	355	policy or the data required to maintain it, this is the
	356	capability it should use to do so. */
	357
	358	#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
	359
	360	#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
3b7391de SH	361
	362	#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
	363
e338d263 AM	364	/*
	365	* Bit location of each capability (used by user-space library and kernel)
	366	*/
	367
	368	#define CAP_TO_INDEX(x) ((x) >> 5) /* 1 << 5 == bits in __u32 */
	369	#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for indexed __u32 */
	370
1da177e4	371	#ifdef __KERNEL__
1da177e4 LT	372
	373	/*
	374	* Internal kernel functions only
	375	*/
b5376771	376
e338d263	377	#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \
ca05a99a	378	for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
e338d263	379
0ad30b8f SH	380	/*
	381	* CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
	382	*
	383	* The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
	384	* At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
	385	*
	386	* It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
	387	*
	388	* We could also define fsmask as follows:
	389	* 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
	390	* 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
	391	*/
	392
e338d263	393	# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \
0ad30b8f	394	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \
e338d263 AM	395	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \
	396	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \
	397	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \
	398	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
	399
e114e473 CS	400	# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
e114e473 CS	401
ca05a99a	402	#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
e338d263 AM	403	# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
	404	#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
	405
25f2ea9f DH	406	# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
	407	# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
	408	# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
0ad30b8f SH	409	# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
	410	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
	411	CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
76a67ec6	412	# define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
0ad30b8f SH	413	\| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
0ad30b8f SH	414	CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
e338d263	415
ca05a99a	416	#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
e338d263 AM	417
	418	#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET CAP_EMPTY_SET
	419
	420	# define cap_clear(c) do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
	421	# define cap_set_full(c) do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
	422	# define cap_set_init_eff(c) do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
	423
	424	#define cap_raise(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] \|= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	425	#define cap_lower(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	426	#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
	427
	428	#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP) \
	429	do { \
	430	unsigned __capi; \
	431	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
	432	c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi]; \
	433	} \
	434	} while (0)
	435
	436	#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP) \
	437	do { \
	438	unsigned __capi; \
	439	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { \
	440	c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi]; \
	441	} \
	442	} while (0)
	443
	444	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
	445	const kernel_cap_t b)
	446	{
	447	kernel_cap_t dest;
	448	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, \|);
	449	return dest;
	450	}
1da177e4	451
e338d263 AM	452	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
	453	const kernel_cap_t b)
	454	{
	455	kernel_cap_t dest;
	456	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
	457	return dest;
	458	}
1da177e4	459
e338d263 AM	460	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
	461	const kernel_cap_t drop)
	462	{
	463	kernel_cap_t dest;
	464	CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
	465	return dest;
	466	}
1da177e4	467
e338d263 AM	468	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
	469	{
	470	kernel_cap_t dest;
	471	CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
	472	return dest;
	473	}
1da177e4	474
e338d263 AM	475	static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
	476	{
	477	unsigned __capi;
	478	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
	479	if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
	480	return 0;
	481	}
	482	return 1;
	483	}
1da177e4	484
9d36be76 EP	485	/*
	486	* Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
	487	* return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
	488	* cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
	489	* return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
	490	* cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
	491	*/
e338d263 AM	492	static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
	493	{
	494	kernel_cap_t dest;
	495	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
	496	return cap_isclear(dest);
	497	}
1da177e4	498
e338d263	499	/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
1da177e4	500
e338d263	501	static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
1da177e4	502	{
e338d263 AM	503	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
e338d263 AM	504	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
1da177e4 LT	505	}
1da177e4 LT	506
e338d263	507	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4	508	{
e338d263 AM	509	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
e338d263 AM	510	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4 LT	511	}
1da177e4 LT	512
e338d263 AM	513	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
e338d263 AM	514	const kernel_cap_t permitted)
1da177e4	515	{
e338d263 AM	516	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
	517	return cap_combine(a,
	518	cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
1da177e4 LT	519	}
1da177e4 LT	520
e338d263	521	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
1da177e4	522	{
e338d263 AM	523	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
e338d263 AM	524	return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
1da177e4 LT	525	}
1da177e4 LT	526
e338d263 AM	527	static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
	528	const kernel_cap_t permitted)
	529	{
	530	const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
	531	return cap_combine(a,
	532	cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
	533	}
1da177e4	534
e338d263 AM	535	extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
	536	extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
	537	extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
1da177e4	538
5cd9c58f DH	539	/**
	540	* has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
	541	* @t: The task in question
	542	* @cap: The capability to be tested for
	543	*
	544	* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
	545	* currently in effect, false if not.
	546	*
	547	* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
	548	*/
3699c53c DH	549	#define has_capability(t, cap) (security_real_capable((t), (cap)) == 0)
	550
	551	/**
	552	* has_capability_noaudit - Determine if a task has a superior capability available (unaudited)
	553	* @t: The task in question
	554	* @cap: The capability to be tested for
	555	*
	556	* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
	557	* currently in effect, false if not, but don't write an audit message for the
	558	* check.
	559	*
	560	* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
	561	*/
	562	#define has_capability_noaudit(t, cap) \
	563	(security_real_capable_noaudit((t), (cap)) == 0)
5cd9c58f DH	564
5cd9c58f DH	565	extern int capable(int cap);
c59ede7b	566
851f7ff5 EP	567	/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
	568	struct dentry;
	569	extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data cpu_caps);
	570
1da177e4 LT	571	#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
	572
	573	#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */