sysfs.txt: add note on available attribute macros

[linux-block.git] / Documentation / admin-guide / perf-security.rst

.. _perf_security:

Perf Events and tool security
=============================

Overview
--------

Usage of Performance Counters for Linux (perf_events) [1]_ , [2]_ , [3]_ can
impose a considerable risk of leaking sensitive data accessed by monitored
processes. The data leakage is possible both in scenarios of direct usage of
perf_events system call API [2]_ and over data files generated by Perf tool user
mode utility (Perf) [3]_ , [4]_ . The risk depends on the nature of data that
perf_events performance monitoring units (PMU) [2]_ collect and expose for
performance analysis. Having that said perf_events/Perf performance monitoring
is the subject for security access control management [5]_ .

perf_events/Perf access control
-------------------------------

To perform security checks, the Linux implementation splits processes into two
categories [6]_ : a) privileged processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred
to as superuser or root), and b) unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is
nonzero). Privileged processes bypass all kernel security permission checks so
perf_events performance monitoring is fully available to privileged processes
without access, scope and resource restrictions.

Unprivileged processes are subject to a full security permission check based on
the process's credentials [5]_ (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and
supplementary group list).

Linux divides the privileges traditionally associated with superuser into
distinct units, known as capabilities [6]_ , which can be independently enabled
and disabled on per-thread basis for processes and files of unprivileged users.

Unprivileged processes with enabled CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability are treated as
privileged processes with respect to perf_events performance monitoring and
bypass *scope* permissions checks in the kernel.

Unprivileged processes using perf_events system call API is also subject for
PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS ptrace access mode check [7]_ , whose outcome
determines whether monitoring is permitted. So unprivileged processes provided
with CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability are effectively permitted to pass the check.

Other capabilities being granted to unprivileged processes can effectively
enable capturing of additional data required for later performance analysis of
monitored processes or a system. For example, CAP_SYSLOG capability permits
reading kernel space memory addresses from /proc/kallsyms file.

perf_events/Perf unprivileged users
-----------------------------------

perf_events/Perf *scope* and *access* control for unprivileged processes is
governed by perf_event_paranoid [2]_ setting:

-1:
     Impose no *scope* and *access* restrictions on using perf_events performance
     monitoring. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb [2]_ locking limit is
     ignored when allocating memory buffers for storing performance data.
     This is the least secure mode since allowed monitored *scope* is
     maximized and no perf_events specific limits are imposed on *resources*
     allocated for performance monitoring.

>=0:
     *scope* includes per-process and system wide performance monitoring
     but excludes raw tracepoints and ftrace function tracepoints monitoring.
     CPU and system events happened when executing either in user or
     in kernel space can be monitored and captured for later analysis.
     Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb locking limit is imposed but
     ignored for unprivileged processes with CAP_IPC_LOCK [6]_ capability.

>=1:
     *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only and excludes
     system wide performance monitoring. CPU and system events happened when
     executing either in user or in kernel space can be monitored and
     captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb
     locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with
     CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.

>=2:
     *scope* includes per-process performance monitoring only. CPU and system
     events happened when executing in user space only can be monitored and
     captured for later analysis. Per-user per-cpu perf_event_mlock_kb
     locking limit is imposed but ignored for unprivileged processes with
     CAP_IPC_LOCK capability.

Bibliography
------------

.. [1] `<https://lwn.net/Articles/337493/>`_
.. [2] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html>`_
.. [3] `<http://web.eece.maine.edu/~vweaver/projects/perf_events/>`_
.. [4] `<https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page>`_
.. [5] `<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html>`_
.. [6] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html>`_
.. [7] `<http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html>`_