security: filesystem capabilities: fix CAP_SETPCAP handling
authorAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Fri, 4 Jul 2008 16:59:59 +0000 (09:59 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fri, 4 Jul 2008 17:40:08 +0000 (10:40 -0700)
commit1209726ce942047c9fefe7cd427dc36f8e9ded53
tree298e78052d6bdd92c78b22c86604f8c8364bc8d9
parent086f7316f0d400806d76323beefae996bb3849b1
security: filesystem capabilities: fix CAP_SETPCAP handling

The filesystem capability support meaning for CAP_SETPCAP is less powerful
than the non-filesystem capability support.  As such, when filesystem
capabilities are configured, we should not permit CAP_SETPCAP to 'enhance'
the current process through strace manipulation of a child process.

Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
security/commoncap.c